American Imperialism; interesting subject that. Most Americans are in a state of empire denial, but that's due in large part to an ignorance of history (no child left behind—especially all you 30+ year old children!). Even so historians have great difficulty classifying the United States;
Hyperpuissance according to French foreign minister Hubert Verdine;
primacy according to Harvard's Kennedy School; or
Hegemony for the
Ender's Game fans out there. Many people subscribe to the Wilsonian notions of democracy especially post 1945 when FDR declared that the age of empire was over. I'll steal a paraphrased thesis from a previous professor and state that imperial power (imperial is much more than military dominance; it's cultural, economic and political) can be acquired by more than one type of political system with regards to democracy. During the cold war the US had to refute charges of American imperialism; acknowledging the period when the US was an oligarchy; in the words of the executive director of the 9/11 commission:
Real imperial power...means a direct monopoly over the organization and the use armed might. It means direct control over the administration of justice and the definition thereof. It means the control over what is bought and sold, the terms of trade and the permission to trade.... Let us stop talking about an American empire, for there is and there will be no such thing."
To address the point that started this tangent I would say Evermore that imperialism is not what I would call fruitless; the most successful nation-states to date are the direct result of empires. They promote order and build institutions, which is sometimes a necessary precondition for liberty.
Now onto Iraq, sure there are plenty of foreign policy blunders, but instead of applying a platitude I'll just go on and list the most profound ones I've heard to date:
1)
Inter arma enim silent leges .
Calling terrorists unlawful enemy combatants. Two years ago we had a JAG officer comment on this when he was on the lecture circuit in the UC system, about the time the Supreme Court was looking at the question of torture on the detainees and the seminal denouncing judgment that "even an assault by the forces of tyranny" would not legitimize the President's authorization of "the tools of tyrants."
Recall the initial grounds for debate. Prior to and shortly after 9/11 there was subject of Criminality vs. War footing as the politicians put it. Well, this was a very apt statement but not one fully understood, as the JAG explained. The US Justice Department had a model for treating terrorists. As criminals. The model:
Manuel Noriega. A great line from his lecture: "Geneva doesn't apply, but we apply it anyway." No torture, just interrogation in his cell, over an unfinished game of chess against fictional Bush 41 which Noriega said, "I beat him every time." (Paraphrasing, I think it may have been, “I kick his behind every time—referring to the chess game”, eliciting laughs from 300 students).
The debate basically outlined that generally terrorists don't wear uniforms to identify themselves and don't carry Geneva 3 cards like US special ops who sometimes use civilian dress. He cited the precedent of resistance forces in Vichy France; had they worn uniforms; it would have been tantamount to suicide. Now the waters get muddy. In the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, these terrorists were involved in an interstate conflict; ergo Geneva applied.
Juxtapose that with systematic abuse (sanctioned or not) Abu Ghraib—or to use James Schlesinger’s euphemism “freelance activities on the part of the night shift”—and holding the detainees incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay or by the CIA via rendition and the legal framework further collapses.
2) WMD
“The Slam-Dunk Case” that wasn’t whatever you want to call it; intelligence failure, a lie…. No need for verbosity here. I personally gave the president the benefit of the doubt; and even if it had been “We don’t know but we’re going to ere on the side of caution” I would have accepted that too.
3) Mission Accomplished
… & the Postwar Occupation of Iraq. Rumsfeld scrapped the State Department’s postwar plan in Iraq and the DOD took over. To give Bremmer some credit, he did try to avoid an insurrection akin to the british, but some of the misconceptions created the conditions for chaos as we saw with the massive looting.
“The Best-laid Plans?” Financial Times, August 3, 2003
…a group in the Pentagon who all along felt that this was going to not be just a cakewalk, it was going to be 60-90 days, a flip-over and a hand-off, a lateral or whatever to…the INC [Iraqi National Congress]. The DoD [Department of Defense] could then wash its hands of the whole affair and depart quickly, smoothly and swiftly. And there would be a democratic Iraq that was amendable to our wishes and desires left in its wake. And that’s all there was to it.
Colon Powell was the only one to bring up “The Pottery Barn Rule,” and the similarity between the prior Anglophone occupations of Iraq during 1917; while General Tommy Franks and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz were under the impression the Iraqis would “greet us as liberators.”
4)
Primus inter pares
The Coalition of the Willing a Prelude to the Iraq war. US diplomacy here could best be described as “Good Cop-Bad Cop.” Powell was the good cop, seeking the blessing of the United Nations; Dick Cheney was the bad cop, deriding the UN as irrelevant. In despite of the mixed messages, the political browbeating resulted in resolution 1441. When Iraq decided at the 11th hour to capitulate this was perceived to be “the same old song and dance.” Ironically, this gave new wind to flagging sails and it was decided more clear-cut language was needed, France’s threat of a veto created the notion that the US was playing the part of the vigilante cowboy.
If you’ve stayed with this, feel free to read on in the link. Despite the foreign policy blunders there have been successes. For our all of our imperial characteristics, we’re largely a beneficent power.
In Praise of American Empire.
